Rédigé sous la forme de questions/réponses, ce guide d’information sur le cadre applicable au financement participatif réalisé par l’AMF et l’ACPR s’adresse aussi bien aux opérateurs de plate-forme de prêts, de dons ou de souscription de titres, qu’aux porteurs de projet en recherche de fonds et aux investisseurs potentiels. Il apporte de façon simple et accessible des réponses concrètes aux questions que peuvent se poser l’ensemble des acteurs du crowdfunding.

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Executive summary
There is a growing realization that distributed ledger technology — popularly known as blockchain — will bring a radical shift in the way we think about financial assets and the way the financial industry will operate in the future. The blockchain journey is likely to be long and the outcome is uncertain, but a consensus is forming that it is the real deal. Disregarding it is a risk.

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This paper analyzes troubled banks’ use of accounting discretion and its interaction with regulatory intervention. During economic downturns, troubled banks have a strong incentive to exploit room for accounting discretion to overstate assets, and consequently, equity and regulatory capital. This may allow troubled banks to conceal their financial difficulties from outsiders, prevent or delay intervention by regulators, and ultimately enable these banks to continue operating...

Academics across multiple disciplines and policymakers in multiple institutions have in recent decades searched for the economic, political, and institutional foundations for financial market strength. Promising theories and empirics have developed, including ma-jor explanations with political economy causes.

A common view is that, because many pro-market corporate reforms occurred during the 1990s in Europe, when social democratic parties governed and financial markets deepened, basic left-right explanations do not work and more complex political explana-tions are needed, presenting an unexpected paradox, in some political scientists’ view. This finding might be interpreted to indicate that left-right orientation is unimportant in affecting financial development and that either nonpolitical institutional issues or diffeent political considerations are more central. We show here, however, first conceptually that it’s not relative local placement of the governing coalition on the nation’s left-right spec-trum that counts, but whether the polity as a whole — i.e., its political center of gravity or its dominant governing coalition — is left or right on economic issues. If interests and opinion shift in a nation such that its political center of gravity is no longer statist and an-ti-market, then even locally left parties could implement change. (And conversely, in an earlier era when interests and opinions were statist and anti-market, one should not ex-pect to see even locally right parties pushing pro-market finance forward.) Second, we bring forward data showing substantial movement over recent decades of political parties and governing coalitions; these shifts must be accounted for in assessing the impact of left-right divisions on financial and securities markets. In large measure, these political shifts correlate with financial markets shifts. Left-right matters in the cross-section, but the left-right economic shifts over time make an empirical difference. The results thereby further buttress the importance of a nation’s basic left-right political orientation in ex-plaining financial market outcomes.